

# Pluralisms—Methodology, Motivations, and Interconnections

## ABSTRACTS

### Thursday, March 2<sup>nd</sup>

**Matti Eklund** (Uppsala University)

Title: “Logic, Truth, Norms: Down the Rabbit Hole”.

Abstract—In my forthcoming book *Choosing Normative Concepts*, I discuss a cluster of issues that arise when we try to call our most fundamental normative concepts into question. In this talk, I discuss how similar issues naturally arise when we try to formulate and evaluate logical pluralism.

**Matthias Rolffs** (University of Bonn)

Title: “Explication, Pluralism, and Causation”

Abstract—My talk has two parts. The first part consists of general methodological considerations about Carnapian explication and its relation to pluralism. In the second part, I will apply these considerations to the philosophy of causation. This can, on the one hand, shed light on a general way of arguing for conceptual pluralism in different areas of philosophy. On the other hand, it can also help to further clarify the thesis of causal pluralism.

**Raffaella Campaner** (University of Bologna)

Title: “Causation and Causal Pluralism: Many Words or Many Things?”

Abstract—Starting from Nancy Cartwright’s well-known paper “Causation: One Word, Many Things” (2004), the paper illustrates some of the versions of causal pluralism put forward in philosophy of science in the last decade or so, pointing out a few issues arising from them. In the second part of the paper, conceptual and epistemological causal pluralism is defended as a valuable option having to do with how we look for causal relations and the contexts in which we do so. After recalling some examples from scientific practice, it is argued that causal pluralism – which happens to be intertwined with other pluralisms – is here to stay.

**Andrea Sereni & Maria Paola Sforza Fogliani** (IUSS, Pavia)

Title: “How to Water a Thousand Flowers. On the Logic of Logical Pluralism”

Abstract—How many logics do logical pluralists adopt, or are allowed to adopt, or ought to adopt, in arguing for their view? These metatheoretical questions lurk behind much of the discussion on logical pluralism, and have a direct bearing on normative issues concerning the choice of a correct logic and the characterization of valid reasoning. Still, they commonly receive just swift answers – if any. Our aim is to tackle these questions head on, by clarifying the range of possibilities that logical pluralists have at their disposal when it comes to the metatheory of their position, and by spelling out which routes are advisable. We explore ramifications of all relevant responses to our question: no logic, a single logic, more than one logic. In the end, we express skepticism that any proposed answer is viable. This threatens the coherence of current and future versions of logical pluralism.

**Ole Hjortland** (University of Bergen)

Title: “Logical Pluralism and Anti-Exceptionalism”

Abstract—Anti-exceptionalism about logic is the Quinean view that logical theories have no special epistemological status, in particular, they are not self-evident or justified a priori. Instead, logical theories are continuous with scientific theories, and knowledge about logic is as hard-earned as knowledge of

physics, economics, and chemistry. Once we reject apriorism about logic, however, we need an alternative account of how logical theories are justified and revised. A number of authors have recently argued that logical theories are justified by abductive argument (e.g. Gillian Russell, Graham Priest, Timothy Williamson). This paper explores one crucial question about the abductive strategy: what counts as evidence for a logical theory? I develop three accounts of evidential confirmation that an anti-exceptionalist can accept: (1) intuitions about validity, (2) the Quine-Williamson account, and (3) indispensability arguments. I argue that the available evidence leads to underdetermination of the choice of logical theory. Against the received view, therefore, anti-exceptionalism does not support classical logic but a form of logical pluralism.

## Friday, March 3<sup>rd</sup>

**Nikolaj Pedersen** (Yonsei University)

Title: “Moderate pluralism about truth, logic, and norms of reasoning”

Abstract: According to pluralism about truth there are several ways of being true. The truth of empirical world propositions such as <There are mountains> might best be accounted for in terms of correspondence to reality while the truth of legal propositions such as <Speeding is illegal> might best be accounted for in terms of coherence with the body of law. So-called moderate truth pluralism is the most prominent form of pluralism about truth. According to this view, truth is both One and Many. Truth is One because there is a single truth property---truth-as-such---that applies across all domains of discourse. If true, propositions are so in the sense of being true-as-such, regardless of what particular domain of discourse they belong to. Truth is Many because propositions from different domains of discourse are true-as-such in virtue of possessing different properties. Empirical world propositions such as <There are mountains> might be true in virtue of corresponding to reality while legal propositions such as <Speeding is illegal> might be true in virtue of cohering with the body of law.

The aim of this paper is to investigate what moderate pluralists should say about logic and, relatedly, what they should say about norms of reasoning that flow from logic. The first part of the paper is dedicated to the first issue, i.e. the connection between truth and logic from the point of view of moderate truth pluralism. The second part of the paper is dedicated to the second issue, i.e. what, given their view on logic, moderate truth pluralists should say about logic-related norms of reasoning.

Validity is standardly defined in terms of necessary truth-preservation: an argument is valid if and only if, necessarily, if the premises are true, then so is the conclusion. Given the intimate connection between validity and truth, it might be natural to think that pluralism about truth supports pluralism about logic. I argue that moderate pluralists about truth should be moderate pluralists about logic. To make this point I draw a distinction between logic proper and quasi-logic. Moderate pluralism about logic is the view that there is only one system that counts as logic proper while several systems qualify as quasi-logics. Logic proper is the study of argument types that necessarily preserve truth-as-such across all domains of discourse. Call argument types of this kind "valid-as-such" or "valid proper". Logic proper is topic neutral. Argument types that are valid-as-such or valid proper preserve truth-as-such for any domain. Quasi-logic is the study of argument types that necessarily preserve truth-as-such when restricted to certain domains. Call argument types of this kind "quasi-valid". Quasi-logic is not topic neutral. Argument types that are quasi-valid preserve truth-as-such only when restricted to certain domains.

I argue that moderate pluralists about truth should be monists about logic proper and pluralists about quasi-logic, i.e. what I called "moderate pluralists about logic". There is only one logic proper but several quasi-logics. There is only one system whose argument types preserve truth-as-such for all domains---namely, the minimal system that contains the argument types that are quasi-valid relative to *every* domain. However, there are several systems whose argument types preserve truth-as-such for a *restricted* class of domains.

Having spelled out the moderate truth pluralist's commitments with respect to logic and quasi-logic I turn to the issue of the normativity. Logic proper and quasi-logic are normative for thought. I discuss three aspects of this normativity, respectively the shared source of the normativity of logic proper and quasi-logic, their difference in scope, and the grounds of this difference.

**Filippo Ferrari & Erik Stei** (University of Bonn)

Title: “Logic, Norms and Reasoning”

Abstract—We discuss the question of whether logic is normative. We claim that this question is multiply ambiguous depending on how exactly we understand the terms ‘logic’ and ‘normative’. We sketch the status quo of the discussion in the recent philosophical literature and we outline some distinctions concerning normative categories with the aim of providing a refined taxonomy to frame normative questions. Next, we suggest a broader view on the debate by distinguishing three ways in which we may properly talk of logic: (i) the level of pure logic and calculus; (ii) the level of applied logic at which the calculus is interpreted in terms of given domains; and (iii) the level at which pure logic is designed with different possible aims in mind. We argue that every level may be governed by different normative principles. Finally, we explore some conjectures about how these three ‘levels’ of logic are normatively bridged in the light of the distinctions in normativity we have introduced.

**Leen De Vreese** (University of Ghent, Centre for Logic and Philosophy of Science)

Title: “How to study causation? Ways and reasons to be(come) a causal pluralist”

Abstract—In my talk, I will first introduce the topic of causal pluralism, show the diversity in possible causally pluralistic approaches, and argue for a basic distinction between conceptual causal pluralism, metaphysical causal pluralism and what I have labelled epistemological-methodological causal pluralism (i.e. the (philosophy of) science point of view). Afterwards, I will delve into possible motivations for adopting these different pluralistic positions (and/or for rejecting their monistic counterparts). In the third part of my talk, I will explain in more detail the (primarily epistemological-methodological) pluralistic approach to causation that my colleagues and I are currently still developing. In the last part of my talk, I will draw the parallel with the pluralistic approach to explanation that we have developed at our research centre and consider whether a similar approach might be helpful as a way forward in other philosophical debates.

**Sebastiano Moruzzi** (University of Bologna)

Title: “Stairways to Pluralism: from Metaphysics to Truth”

Abstract—In this talk I explore the connections between ontological pluralism, alethic pluralism and their related deflationary opposing views—i.e. metaphysical deflationism and alethic deflationism. Building on the work of Pedersen (2014), Cotnoir & Edwards (2015) and Thomasson (2015) I sketch a general route from ontological pluralism to alethic pluralism.

**Greg Restall** (University of Melbourne)

Title: “Logical Pluralism: Meaning, Rules and Counterexamples”

Abstract: I attempt to give a pluralist and syntax-independent account of classical and constructive proof, grounded in univocal rules for evaluating assertions and denials for judgments featuring the logical connectives, interpretable as governing warrants for and against claims, and which results in an interpretation of classical and constructive counterexamples to invalid arguments.

**Saturday, March 4<sup>th</sup>****Elke Brendel** (University of Bonn)

Title: “Truth Pluralism and the Truthmaker-Paradox”

Abstract—Peter Milne has recently attempted to refute truthmaker maximalism (TMM), the view according to which every truth has a truthmaker, on mere logical grounds via a self-referential sentence M saying of itself that it does not have a truthmaker. It is shown that Milne’s argument against TMM fails. M is, contrary to what Milne claims, not a Gödel sentence, but a paradoxical sentence, similar to the

Liar sentence. M is thus an interesting form of a semantic paradox, but has no significance for the question of whether TMM is correct. The correctness of TMM depends, *inter alia*, on whether one can solve the so-called “problem of the missing truthmaker”, i. e., whether one can explain what truthmakers true propositions have that are not about the mere existence of something, such as mathematical theorems, negative existentials or modal claims. It is argued that truth pluralism gives rise to a pluralist account of truthmakers and of the truthmaking relation and therefore seems to be capable of addressing this problem.

**Dorothee Schmitt** (University of Bonn)

Title: “Pluralism, Relativism, Methodology”

Abstract—The talk explores the relationship between various forms of relativism and pluralism in motivation, structure and compatibility. The focus is on forms of relativism that present themselves as more than just views on semantics, enabling comparison of metaphysical commitments.

**Pilar Terrés Villalonga** (University of Barcelona)

Title: “Substructural logics and the meaning of logical constants”

Abstract: In this talk I argue that the normative role of a logical constant is not only determined by its truth conditions, but also by the specific notion of logical consequence under which it is embedded. In particular, I show how the different substructural logics require different behaviors of the same logical constants, which is explained by a relation between the structural rules and certain Gricean maxims. The talk has four parts: first, I present a general overview of substructural logics and of the effect of structural rules on the behavior of the logical constants (focusing on conjunction and disjunction, and following the work of Francesco Paoli). Second, I suggest a relation between each structural rule and the Gricean maxims, which entails that substructural formalizations of “follows from” are pragmatically enriched. Third, I argue for the legitimacy of substructural languages, arguing that (i) substructural notions of logical consequence capture legitimate senses of “follows from” and that (ii) substructural formalizations of “and” and “or” are also pragmatically enriched, and that this enrichment is required given the specific meaning of “follows from” under which they are embedded. Finally, I argue that this pragmatic enrichment requires different inferential roles of the logical constants but that there is no change of meaning across logics.

**Florian Steinberger** (Birkbeck College, University of London)

Title: “Logical pluralism and normativity”

Abstract—In this talk I explore the relation between different forms of logical pluralism (Carnap 1935, Beall and Restall 2006, Field 2009, Shapiro 2015) and the question of the normativity of logic. In particular, I investigate whether there is a plausible variant of pluralism that satisfies the following two criteria: (i) it makes room for normative conflicts between advocates of different logics, and (ii) it is immune to the “collapse problem” (Caret 2016) levelled at Beall and Restall-style pluralism by Priest (2006), Read (2006) and Keefe (2014).

**Kris McDaniel** (Syracuse University)

Title: “Modes of Instantiation”

Abstract—Modes of instantiation are allegedly different ways in which an object can have a property. Should we believe in modes of instantiation? And if so, are facts about modes of instantiation fundamental or are they grounded in further facts? I discuss several views in which facts about modes of instantiation are grounded in further facts about modes of being/existence.